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Abstract. From July 20 to July 25, 2008, the Dagstuhl Seminar 08302
Countering Insider Threats  was held in Schloss Dagstuhl  Leibniz
Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants pre-
sented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were
discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well
as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper.
The ﬁrst section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links
to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
Keywords. Insider Threat, Security Policies, Threat Modelling
08302 Summary  Countering Insider Threats
Christian W. Probst, Jeﬀrey Hunker, Matt Bishop, Dieter Gollmann
This article summarizes the objectives and structure of a seminar with the same
title, held from July 20th to July 25th, 2008, at Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany. The
seminar brought together researchers and policy-makers from all involved com-
munities, to clarify what it is that identiﬁes an insider threat, and to develop a
common vision of how an insider can be categorized as well as an integrated ap-
proach that allows a qualitative reasoning about the threat and the possibilities
of attacks. This report gives an overview of the discussions and presentations
during the week, as well as the outcome of these discussions.
Keywords: Insider threat, executive summary
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1793
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Combatting Insider Misuse, with Relevance to Integrity
and Accountability in Elections and Other Applications
Peter G. Neumann (SRI International, US)
Various risks of insider misuse arise at diﬀerent layers of abstraction. This obser-
vation leads to a perspective on insiders that is both hierarchical and context-
dependent. This position paper examines systemic approaches that might be
most useful in overcoming the risks. It applies these approaches to the problems
of developing and operating computer-related systems that would be suitable for
use in applications requiring trustworthy systems and networking, such as criti-
cal infrastructures, privacy-preserving database systems, voting systems, and so
on. It also examines the relevance of the Saltzer-Schroeder security principles to
elections.
Ultimately, insider misuse cannot be sensibly addressed unless signiﬁcant im-
provements are made in system and networking trustworthiness, architecturally,
developmentally, and operationally.
Some of the distinctions presented here are intentionally not all clear-cut.
There are nuances that must be considered, because blurrings exist among what
some people might superﬁcially think are dichotomies. These subtleties can be
quite signiﬁcant in assessing how we should approach insider misuse within the
more general context of system and network trustworthiness.
This position paper draws on and extends an earlier one, The Challenges of
Insider Misuse, that the author wrote for the 1999 RAND Workshop on Prevent-
ing, Detecting, and Responding to Malicious Insider Misuse, 16-18 August 1999,
of which he was a co-organizer. Sadly, many of the conclusions of that earlier
analysis are still relevant today.
Keywords: Insider threat, security policy, access control
What is the Insider Problem?
Matt Bishop (Univ. of California - Davis, US)
The insider problem has long been considered one of the most serious threats
to computer security, and one of the most diﬃcult to combat. But the problem
has never been deﬁned precisely. Our work presents a deﬁnition of the insider
problem and shows how the deﬁnition enables an analysis of the set of problems
traditionally lumped into the insider problem. It introduces a hierarchy of
policy abstractions, and argues that the insider is deﬁned in discrepancies
between the diﬀerent layers of abstraction. It also presents a methodology for
analyzing the threat based upon our deﬁnitions.
Joint work of: Matt Bishop; Carrie Gates; Sophie Engle; Sean Peisert
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The Insider Threat and Security Management
Lizzie Coles-Kemp (RHUL - London, GB)
An organisation often regards an insider as a member of the organisation who is,
in some way, empowered to represent it. Traditionally information security man-
agement frameworks and systems have a speciﬁc formal process for accepting an
individual into an organisation and for removing an individual from an organi-
sation but rely on policy compliance, incident management and audit processes
for security management of the insider.
A study of 36 organisations and their security management structures con-
cluded that an organisation has multiple views and beliefs about information
security and how it should be managed. Compliance is only one of those views.
Moreover the study concluded that there are aspects of organisational culture
and structure which aﬀect both how those views are expressed and the security
management forms they give rise to.
Organisational sociology and theories of organisational management and
structure help us to better understand how these diﬀerent views of informa-
tion security are formed. They also provide diﬀerent perspectives through which
to evaluate traditional security management methods for responding to the in-
sider threat. This talk presents a number of those theories and summarises the
conclusions from case studies in which those theories were applied.
Modeling and Classifying Security Vulnerabilities
Sophie Engle (Univ. of California - Davis, US)
This work began by observing that most classiﬁcation schemes today are ad-
hoc and classify bugs which tend to lead to vulnerabilities, but not classify
vulnerabilities themselves. We ask two fundamental questions: (1) what is the
diﬀerence between a bug and vulnerability, and (2) is it possible to build a non
ad-hoc vulnerability classiﬁcation framework based on characteristics? This has
led to the creation of a formal model of security, policy, and vulnerabilities based
on the Turing machine. By applying this model to the problem of insider threat,
we are able to oﬀer diﬀerent categories of insider threat, and provide insight to
where, why, and how insiders may pose a threat to an organization.
Keywords: Security, policy, vulnerabilities, insider threat, insider problem,
formal model, classiﬁcation
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The Insider Threat from the Business Perspective
Ulrich Flegel (SAP Research Center Karlsruhe, DE)
We present our view on the insider threat from the business perspective of our
customers. This encompasses two parts.
In the ﬁrst part we summarize the state of the art of fraud detection in
practice and show the relations between the technology for fraud detection and
intrusion detection. We identify prospective directions for further investigation
and imminent challenges.
In the second part we investigate the privacy dimension of collaborative fraud
detection envisioned for outsourcing scenarios. Firstly, we investigate the privacy
requirements derived from privacy law and present the resulting judicial argu-
ment for pseudonymizing audit data generated for the purpose of fraud detection.
Second, we summarize the requirements for such pseudonymization derived from
the requirements of the misuse detection approach for fraud detection. Third, we
describe our approach for pseudonymization of audit data and two approaches
for hiding timestamps in audit data.
Keywords: Insider threat, occupational fraud, privacy law, PET, logical clocks,
pseudonyms




Detecting Potential Insider Threats in Policies for
E-Systems
Michael Huth (Imperial College London, GB)
Increasingly, access to electronic systems or system resources is regulated through
the enforcement of policies. These policies are often composed of policies that
reside at diﬀerent locations and are written with local concerns in mind. Such
complex policies, as abstract and potentially remote access interfaces, can thus
blur the boundaries between insiders and outsiders, and may enable outsiders to
become insiders without entering inside a physical domain.
The semantics of real policies is typically given by the compiler or the
standard, creating an obstacle to formal and automated analysis. The academic
literature, as another extreme, features toy policy languages with formal se-
mantics such that writing policies, let alone analyzing them, often requires the
expertise of a PhD.
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In this talk we ponder the feasibility of narrowing this gap between practical
but meaningless policy-driven systems and theoretical but inadequate policy
languages such that better static or dynamic detection techniques for potential
insider threats can be developed.
Keywords: Policies, access control, policy implementation, formal methods
Software Assurance for Countering Insider Threats
Jan Jürjens (The Open University - Milton Keynes, GB)
Compliance frameworks, laws and regulations such as Sarbanes Oxley, Basel II,
Solvency II, HIPAA etc. demand from companies in a more and more rigorous
way to demonstrate that their organisation, processes and supporting IT land-
scape implement and follow a set of guidelines at diﬀering levels of abstraction,
which have the goal to limit the risks arising from insider threats. This work
aims to contribute to a software engineering process which is driven by security,
risk and compliance management considerations.
We concentrate on a part of this approach that focusses on the question how
one can use software engineering methods and tools to enforce that the conﬁgura-
tion of a system enforces the security policies that arise from business compliance
regulations, with an emphasis on security policies that aim to counter insider
threats. We present tool support for Model-based Compliance Engineering, i.e.
for the model-based development and analysis of software conﬁgurations that
ensures compliance with security policies. It allows one to check UML models
of business applications and their conﬁguration data for adherence to security
policies and compliance requirements. The tool is based on standardized data
formats, such as UML and XML, which makes its integration into existing busi-
ness architectures as eﬃcient as possible.
More information at: http://mcs.open.ac.uk/jj2924/research
Full Paper:
http://mcs.open.ac.uk/jj2924/publications/papers/fase08.pdf
See also: J. Jürjens, J. Schreck, and Yijun Yu: Automated Analysis of Permission-
Based Security using UMLsec. FASE 2008 (ETAPS)
Countering Insider Threats - a governmental view
Volker Kozok (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung - Bonn, DE)
Governmental Deﬁnition: Insiders are individuals who are or previously have
been authorized to use the information systems they eventually employed to
penetrate harm.
6 Matt Bishop, Dieter Gollmann, Jeﬀrey Hunker and Christian W. Probst
Insiders in the governmental area are soldiers, oﬃcials, employees, are labor-
ers. The important aspect of governmental insiders is that they have the duty
of allegiance, are mostly security checked and trained, working with information
that is classiﬁed oﬃcial secret.
Cases include unauthorized or illegal attempts to view, disclose, retrieve,
delete, change, or add information; exceed or misuse an authorized level of net-
work, system or data access in a manner that aﬀected the security of data,
systems or daily business operations of the Federal Armed Forces. Most cases
are the use of IT-systems for private purposes.
The reactions consist of disciplinary or labor law sanctions from the internal
organization, or in the criminal cases from law enforcement.
Keywords: Critical infrastructure, legal aspects, incident management, moti-
vation
Systematizing Insider Threat Mitigation
George Magklaras (University of Oslo, NO)
The talk outlines a range of techniques that facilitate predictive insider threat
modeling. The results of a speciﬁc Insider Misuse survey are presented followed
by a system-oriented taxonomy that classiﬁes misusers according to system-
level detectable consequences. It is important to relate a threat to an insider.
Various Insider Threat predictive models are discussed and an Insider Threat
Prediction Speciﬁcation Language expressing system-level speciﬁc threat metrics
is introduced.
The talk includes extensive references to relevant research areas and should be
used mainly as reference material. The research is conducted at the Information
Security and Network Research Group, University of Plymouth, UK.
Keywords: Insider Threat, predictive modeling, Domain Speciﬁc Languages
(DSL), Insider Threat Taxonomy
Beyond Dolev-Yao
Jan Meier (TU Hamburg-Harburg, DE)
This talk proposes to analyze security protocols in the face of insider attacks.
In contrast to Dolev-Yao attackers, insiders have initial knowledge. By allowing
for insiders, the focus of the protocol analysis shifts. It is no longer the prime
goal to verify if an attacker is able to obtain certain information. What becomes
more important is what insiders can do with such information. In order to limit
the impact of insiders, they should not be able to use information from one
protocol run in another protocol run. To verify this additional protocol goal, this
talk proposes to model actions insiders can perform. Having a way to measure
the impact of insiders enables protocol designers to build more insider-resistant
protocols.
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Some examples from real life
Vebjorn Moen (GE Money Bank - Stavanger, NO)
A short overview of which kind of insider problems we experience in GE Money
Ban k, and how we work to handle the risk.
Making Attack Analysis as Simple as Possible, and no
Simpler
Sean Peisert (Univ. of California - Davis, US)
Anomaly detection and misuse detection can't stop the insider problem before
it happens. The techniques can reduce the insider problem in some ways, but
they can't come close to eliminating it. For example, misuse detection doesn't
work, by deﬁnition. Insiders are doing their jobs, and so how could we recognize
them as intruders? In many cases, the best that we can do is analyze events
after the fact. However, traditionally audit trails have been some combination
of overwhelming, misleading, imprecise, or lacking in detail or scope. We assert
that there are methods of addressing this issue, starting with the idea that
there are some elements of intrusion analysis which are an art and some which
are a science, and that although the proportion will undoubtedly become more
scientiﬁc over time, there is a portion of the discipline which science can't and
shouldn't try to address.
Thus we have started to work on the problem of intrusion analysis, and
thus insider analysis, in two ways. First, we have developed a model of forensic
logging, which helps to direct and understand the data necessary to log, and
also helps to correlate that data once logged. But the amount of data can still
be overwhelming to a human analyst who will perform their analysis art, and
so we are also developing methods to help signiﬁcantly prune away unrelated
data that an analyst does not need to look at, and thus, the potential sources of
attack or failure are signiﬁcantly reduced.
We hypothesise that forensics has focused nearly exclusively on analysts
rather than presenting meaningful information to the people that actually care
and can understand the signiﬁcance and value of objects and events, and thus
is best able to prioritize how to handle them. This makes the best use of human
time by spreading the analysis eﬀort, and it allows the lay-analysts to determine
the appropriate level of necessary logging and then analyze that data in the
context of their area of expertise.
However, to return to our original notion, if all one is doing is generating
data, then we've already failed. We simply can't look through that much data
on a regular basis. Thus our combined approach is to formalize a process for
understanding how to prune data that we know is irrelevant (science), and then
present it to the people who understand it best in a way that they can understand
it and proceed accordingly (art).
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Keywords: Insider, forensics, analysis, attack graphs, optimistic access control,
transparent society
Towards a taxonomy of insider action
Joel Predd (RAND - Pittsburgh, US)
A framework is developed for organizing the four key dimensions of insider
threats: the organization, the individual, the system, and the environment. The
frame work is used as a basis for a taxanomy of insider actions that can be used
to characterize diﬀerent insider threats, and to identify distinguishing features of
diﬀerent insider actions. Implications of the taxonomy for response are discussed.
Joint work of: Joel Predd; Jeﬀrey Hunker; Shari Lawrence Pﬂeeger
Modelling the Real World
Christian W. Probst (Technical University of Denmark, DK)
Analysing real-world systems for vulnerabilities with respect to security and
safety threats is a diﬃcult undertaking, not least due to a lack of availability
of formalizations for those systems. Many approaches to assurance of (critical)
infrastructure security are based on (quite successful) ad-hoc techniques. We
believe that they can be signiﬁcantly improved beyond the state-of-the-art by
pairing them with static analysis techniques.
We present an approach that formalises real-world systems as directed graphs,
which in turn are mapped on a process calculus with support for access control.
The process calculus provides the underlying semantics, which allows for easy de-
velopment of analyses for the abstracted system. The system model is extensible,
and allows modular composition of larger scenarios.
Keywords: Insider threat, formal model, access control
Joint work of: Christian W. Probst; René Rydhof Hansen
Overview of the Human Factors Division, Department of
Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate
Colby Raley (Strategic Analysis, Inc. - Washington, US), Patricia Wolfhope (De-
partment of Homeland Defence, US)
The Human Factors Division of DHS S/T is moving far beyond classical human
factors research and development to explore the human factor in all DHS-
relevant problem spaces.
Human-machine optimization, biometrics, radicalization analysis and obser-
vational methods for the detection of suspicious behavior are being explored.
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Insider ThreatWhat can we learn from Human Factors
M. Angela Sasse (University College London, GB)
 systems that are diﬃcult to use lead to mistakes and a negative perception
of security
 in an organisation where many users make mistakes, the behaviour of an
inside attacker is hard to detect
 need to get honest users on-sidehuman intelligence is only way of detect-
ing novel attacks
 divide and conquercontrol in areas associated with high risk, trust else-
where
 any detected breach of trust must be dealt with, and seen to be dealt with
Insider DoS on Access Control Systems
Ludwig Seitz (Axiomatics AB - Kista, SE)
Many modern access control systems support delegation. Naive implementations
of the delegation chain veriﬁcation algorithm allow for an insider denial of service
attack against the access control system by introducing policies that trigger the
worst-case complexity of the veriﬁcation algorithm. This kind of attack is possible
even if the insider only has been delegated very limited rights.
Keywords: Access Control, Delegation, Insider Attack, Denial of Service
Insider Threat Detection: Host and Network Monitoring
Techniques
Salvatore Stolfo (Columbia University, US)
We presented a deﬁnition of insider attack diﬀerentiating between masqueraders
(attackers who impersonate another inside user) and traitors (an inside attacker
using their own, legitimate credentials).
Our research at Columbia is sponosred by the Dartmouth College-hosted I3P
organization with funding from the US Department of Homeland Security.
We presented background work on modeling user actions in order to detect
abnormal user behavior indicative of masquerade attacks. Intent is modeled by
categorizing commands. In particular search actions are especially important to
identify likely masquerade attacks. The reasoning is that a masquerader lacks
knowledge and would ﬁrst search to learn what is available on the target system.
Our other line of work is of an oﬀensive nature to confuse and deceive a
traitor by leveraging uncertainty, to reduce the knowledge they ordinarily have.
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We presented trap-based technology, decoys that look like real objects but are
purposely planted to detect nefarious acts. An operational example was pre-
sented by way of decoy documents with embedded beacons. When the decoy
is opened, an alert is generated and emailed.
Keywords: Insider threat, decoy, deception, host monitoring, masquerade de-
tection
Criminology theories and the insider treatA
social/psychological perspective
Marianthi Theoharidou (Athens University of Economics and Business, GR)
Modern crime prevention theories are presented and compared with the predom-
inant theory in the Information Systems ﬁeldGeneral Deterrence Theory. We
examined the incentive mechanisms of these theories and also publications that
attempt to describe psychological proﬁles of insiders. Finally, some implications
for practice are discussed.
Insider-free Computing
Alec Yasinsac (University of South Alabama, US)
For centuries, the Maginot Line model was the standard security representation
of choice. In this model, defenses focused on protecting the security perimeter
from malicious intruders. While modern day armed forces long ago abandoned
the Maginot Line model as obsolete in the rapidly changing horizontal and ver-
tical battleﬁelds of today, information security researchers have not been able to
replace our perimeter defense posture. Thus, insider attacks continue to garner
research attention and to threaten our networks and applications.
In this talk, we consider an emerging model that allows only two types of
relationships between subjects (OWNER and NONE), thus eliminating insiders
from the environment, and two types of objects (OWNED and UNOWNED).
We discuss the security properties of this model, its practical limitations, and
the prospective impact of its implementation. The main takeaway from the talk
is to encourage minimizing and isolating transferred trust.
Keywords: Isolating trust, Maginot Line
